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Casual empiricism suggests that “unwarranted” wage changes, defined as the part of wage 
growth that is not explained by changes in labour productivity, are negatively associated with 
the return on capital. The main point of this paper is to show that “unwarranted” wage 
changes have no causal effect on capital return. To this end, we show that standard theoretical 
models, in which “unwarranted” wages changes and the return on capital are endogenously 
determined, do not necessarily predict a negative association between them. We then estimate 
aggregate net return on capital equations using panel data for 19 OECD countries for the 
period 1970-2000 in which we account for the endogeneity of “unwarranted” wage changes 
by exploiting variations in institutional and labour market characteristics. We find that 
“unwarranted” wage changes do not affect the return on capital. This result remains robust to 
alternative empirical specifications and to alternative definitions of profitability and 
“unwarranted” wage changes. An implication of our findings is that standard calls for reforms 
aiming at wage moderation following the appearance of “unwarranted” wage changes are not 
always justified. 
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1. Introduction 
From Smith, Ricardo, and Marx, through to Keynes, Kalecki, and Schumpeter, and to modern endogenous 
growth theorists, economists have agreed that the long-run performance of capitalist economies is 
organized around the pursuit of profits.
1 The importance of profits for the “medium run” has also been 
recognized by influential studies regarding, for instance, developments in the labour market (e.g. Sachs, 
1979; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Blanchard, 1997). A common thread of these studies is the evolution of 
factor shares following the oil price shocks in the 1970s and its implications for the rise of European 
unemployment. Bruno (1984) has demonstrated that an increase in oil prices can be considered as an 
autonomous technical regress that necessitates a decrease in real wages to avoid a rise in unemployment. 
The failure of real wages to adjust to the adverse productivity developments in many European countries 
triggered the emergence of a “real wage gap” (defined as the difference between the observed real wage 
and the estimated full-employment real wage) accompanied by a decline in profitability and the capital 
share.  
Among the international economic organizations, the OECD has been particularly keen in noting the 
importance of profitability for the future evolution of macroeconomic aggregates: “… high levels of 
corporate profitability across the OECD area may entail favourable surprises for capital formation, 
employment and growth” (OECD, 2006, p.2). Combining this with the observation that the strong rise in 
profit margins is associated with muted real wage developments, the OECD draws the conclusion that 
“…the current pattern of real wage increases in excess of productivity growth could compromise future 
economic performance […] It is important that wage settlements […] reflect productivity developments” 
(op.cit. p.101, italics added).  
The simple bivariate relationship between profits and “unwarranted” wage changes, measured as the 
                                                 
1 Perhaps the most emblematic analysis of the role of profits in the evolution of capitalist economies has been given 
by Ricardo. In his model, the distribution of income between land rents, profits and (subsistence) wages determines 
the economy’s evolution. As long as the profit rate is above what capitalists would deem as acceptable, capital will 
be accumulated. This process will come to a halt when, due to diminishing returns, the profit rate falls and capital 
accumulation and growth come to an end (i.e., Ricardo’s “stationary state”). Keynes considered profits as the 
“mainspring of change”, whereas for the modern endogenous growth theory, growth-enhancing innovations stem 
from the profit-seeking efforts of entrepreneurs (see, for instance, Aghion and Howitt, 1998).   2
part of wage growth that is not explained by changes in labour productivity, is summarized in Figure 1, 
which plots the 5-year averages of the net return on capital and our estimates of unwarranted wages from 
OECD economies over the period 1970-2000. In accordance with the theoretical framework described 
earlier on and conventional wisdom (as exemplified by the OECD), Figure 1 indeed shows that there is a 
clear negative association between the two variables. In contrast, this paper presents detailed evidence that 
there is no causal association between unwarranted (or “excessive”) wage changes and the return on 
capital or profitability.
2 This finding implies that the usual policy advice given by international economic 
organizations to countries experiencing unwarranted wages changes to moderate wage growth in order to 
reflect productivity is not always justified.  
The main idea driving the empirical methodology adopted in this paper is that both wages and the 
return on capital may be jointly determined by changes in the economic, political, and institutional 
environment (see, among others, Christofides and Oswald, 1992; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Rodrik, 
1999; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). In particular, with regard to changes in the economic environment a 
number of theoretical developments, like implicit contract theory and firm-union bargaining theories, 
suggest that the pressure for wage increases above productivity changes will be particularly intense in 
countries (or times) of higher profits. In this vein, Mumford and Dowrick (1994) have noticed that 
“observed profitability is an endogenous variable, affected directly by wage outcomes and perhaps 
indirectly through efficiency wage effects, so single equation estimates of the relationship between wages 
and financial performance may be subject to simultaneous equation bias [...] This result is consistent with 
the prediction that exogenous shocks to the wage influence the profit term and bias the estimating 
parameter downwards”. Hence, as long as there is some sharing of the rents generated by the employment 
relationship, these common shocks will affect both business conditions and the wage negotiation process. 
Rent sharing is at the core of both the firm-union bargaining models (e.g. Layard et al., 1991, 
                                                 
2 In the remainder of the paper the terms the terms “unwarranted” and “excessive” wages, as well as profitability and 
return on capital will be used interchangeably. It should be stressed that, although in our empirical analysis we use 
various measures for unwarranted wage changes, we avoid constructing a “real wage gap” variable in the spirit of 
Bruno and Sachs (1985) as this is unduly restricted to both a perfectly competitive interpretation of the data and to a 
presumption of knowledge of the “equilibrium” real wage rate (see Bean, 1994, for more details).    3
Blanchflower et al., 1996) and search-and-matching models (e.g. Pissarides, 2000).
3  
Similarly, changes in both profits and unwarranted wage changes can be caused by changes in the 
structural features of the labour market, like the composition of the labour force or working conditions. An 
important (and highly political) instance of a change in working conditions is the regulation of working 
time. In response to the rise in unemployment in many OECD countries in the late 1970s, the idea that a 
redistribution of what was considered to be a fixed amount of work among a larger number of persons 
gained ground as a sensible alternative (called by many economists the lump of labour fallacy). Some 
countries did in fact promote such measures – mainly the reduction of the institutionally set standard hours 
of work per week. The effect of such measures on worker productivity, wages, employment, and 
profitability has been a widely studied area, which is comprehensively surveyed by Hart (1992). The 
relevance of institutional/political factors has also been studied extensively in the literature. Card (1996) 
and Card and DiNardo (2002) study how de-unionization and the erosion of the real value of the minimum 
wage have affected the evolution of the wage distribution in the United States. Blau and Kahn (1999, 
2000) review and examine how differences in the degree of centralization of the bargaining process across 
countries have impacted on the shape of the bottom end of the wage distribution. Rodrik (1999) 
documents the influence of the political regime on wage formation across countries. Although these 
papers do not deal with the influence of these institutional/political changes on the return on capital, they 
highlight the independent influence of these factors on wages beyond the impact of productivity 
developments. More importantly, they also imply that the negative relationship between the return on 
capital and unwarranted wage changes observed in the data will consequently reflect an equilibrium 
response to changes in structural and/or institutional characteristics of the economy resulting in a spurious 
correlation driven through the particular labour market channels.  
To address these issues we investigate the impact of excessive wage changes on various measures of 
profitability by estimating aggregate profit equations using panel data for 19 OECD countries for the 
                                                 
3 The implicit contract literature (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975) also implies that there can be a positive co-movement 
between wages and profits per employee as a result of risk-sharing, if both workers and firms are risk averse 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).       4
period 1970-2000. We show that in non-instrumental regressions excessive wages are found to exert a 
negative impact on capital return and profits. In contrast to this finding, the estimated effect of excessive 
wages on capital return and profits changes starkly when we account for the endogeneity of unwarranted 
wage changes. We are able to show that once we instrument out unwarranted wage changes by exploiting 
variations in institutional and labour market characteristics, the relationship between profits and excessive 
wages evaporates. This result is robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including various definitions of 
profitability and excessive wage changes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some theoretical considerations 
regarding the endogeneity of unwarranted wage changes and the return on capital. Section 3 outlines the 
empirical setup and describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 discusses 
some sensitivity tests. Finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
In this section we briefly review some arguments on the lack of a causal, and negative, relationship 
between unwarranted wage changes and the return on capital. It is worth reiterating at this point that we 
are not claiming that a deux ex machina rise in wages will not adversely affect profitability (at least in a 
partial equilibrium framework); instead, we show that once we take into account the possibility that both 
wage changes and profitability are jointly determined in response to changes in the economic/institutional 
environment, the co-movement between the two variables is far from unambiguous. 
Why real wage changes may not fully reflect changes in labour productivity? Indeed, a perfectly 
competitive model, under a Cobb-Douglas technology, does not allow for a divergence between wages 
and labour productivity, since in this case the marginal product of labour is a fixed proportion of labour 
productivity with the degree of proportionality being equal to the labour share. Hence, wages are equal to 
the marginal product and maintain their proportionality to labour productivity. However, if the economy’s 
production structure is not adequately described by a Cobb-Douglas function, then changes in underlying 
structural or institutional parameters may raise both wages relative to productivity and the return on   5
capital even under perfectly competitive conditions. 
Consider, for instance, the response of a firm to changes in how labour effort is affected by wage 
incentives. Assume now a change in the social/institutional environment such that, at a given gap between 
the wage paid by the firm and the alternative wage rate, the elasticity of effort with respect to the premium 
the firm pays over the alternative wage increases.
4 How are we to interpret changes in this elasticity (call it 
θ ), or what are real-world structural/institutional changes which may influence its value? The quality of 
labor relations is an important variable in this respect. We would expect that an intensification of conflict 
in industrial relations would affect the effort that a given value of the relative wage differential would 
procure. A change in the composition of the labour force is another possible factor that may affect the 
value of the elasticity of effort with respect to the “relative wage differential”. For example an increase in 
the proportion of teenagers in the labour force may affect the “economy-wide” value of θ , as teenagers 
may dislike a faster moving production line more than prime-aged workers. Similarly, to the extent that 
sectoral reallocation of economic activity involves changes in the typical working environment (e.g. clerks 
versus construction workers), the “economy-wide” value of θ  will also be affected. In the Appendix we 
present an example of an efficiency-wage model in which we study the effects of changes in the value of 
θ  on unwarranted wage changes and the return on capital. The example is based on using a CES 
production function, which does not constrain the marginal product of labour to be a fixed percentage of 
the average product, thus allowing for the ratio of wages, which are equal to the marginal product, to 
labour productivity to vary in response to changes in both the labour and capital inputs. We find that 
changes in the elasticity of effort induce firms to change their wages and use of factor inputs so that a 
positive co-movement between excessive wages and the return on capital can be generated.
5 
The lack of a causal (and necessarily negative) relationship between excessive wage changes and the 
                                                 
4 The political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1997, 2008) has documented shifts in many industrial countries away from 
the disciplined, self-denying, and achievement-oriented norms of industrial society (which is associated with 
deference to tradition and the attachment to organizational goals) towards the fulfilment of personal goals and 
individual self-expression at the cost of neglecting the objectives of broader entities.    
5 The direction of the co-movement (whether both excessive wages and the return on capital fall, or both rise, in 
response to a rise in θ ) is influenced by the elasticity of substitution.    6
return on capital may also be present in an imperfectly competitive framework. In particular, if the labour 
market is not perfectly competitive, wages need not be equal to the marginal product of labour. Figure 2 
portrays the average and marginal product of labour schedules for a firm that does not pay a wage equal to 
the marginal product.
  Instead, we assume that, for example due to the presence of trade unions, the 
workers are able to appropriate some rents and the wage, 0 w , is between the marginal and average product 
of labour at employment level N0.
6 Total profits are initially equal to N0(AP0 – W0). The dotted schedule, 
known as the rent division curve (Booth, 1995), which maintains at all employment levels its relative 
vertical distance between the average and marginal product schedules, can be thought of as tracing out the 
resulting wage rate under constant relative bargaining power between the firm and the union.
7 Consider 
now a new equilibrium with wages and employment equal to W1 and N1, respectively. The movement 
from (w0, N0) to (w1, N1) can be triggered in a Nash bargaining framework by shifts of both the contract 
curve (e.g. due to changes in the minimum wage) and/or shifts along the (new) contract curve (e.g. due to 
a change in relative bargaining power). For example, the new (w1,  N1) pair may result from the 
combination of a rise in union power, which is expected to shift the wage closer to the average product, 
and a fall in the minimum wage, which is expected to increase employment by shifting the origin of a 
positively-sloped contract curve downwards and to the right. If the (percentage) drop in wages is relatively 
smaller than the drop in labour productivity (AP), then we have an unwarranted wage increase. Yet, as the 
Figure shows, the rise in the ratio of wages to productivity can be associated with a rise in profits (and the 
return on capital, since the capital stock is assumed fixed in this example), which are now equal to N1(AP1 
                                                 
6 Although there is no dispute as to whether some workers are paid above their marginal products, there is some 
dispute about whether some workers are paid below their marginal product (see, for instance, Frank, 1984; Machin et 
al., 1993; Hellerstein et al., 1999). 
7 When the bargaining power is symmetrically distributed between the two parties, the Nash bargaining framework 
implies a bargained wage that is the arithmetic mean between the average and the marginal product of labour (see, 
McDonald and Solow, 1991). In this case, the dotted schedule (rent division curve) would be vertically equidistant 
between the marginal and average product schedules at all employment levels. If the bargaining power is 
asymmetrically distributed, then the wage is a weighted average of the average and the marginal product, the weights 
being equal to the relative bargaining power of each party; the higher is the (relative) power of the union, the closer 
will be the rent division curve to the average product schedule. We note that the rent division curve traces out the 
wage-employment combinations that result from shifts in the position of the contract curve (e.g., due to a change in 
alternative opportunities for workers) for a non-changing bargaining power.   7
– W1). Thus, a negative co-movement between unwarranted wage changes on the return on capital is not 
certain a-priori.  
Beyond these partial equilibrium examples, it is also important to take into account of possible 
macroeconomic interactions. To this purpose let us assume that the profitability of firms in a particular 
sector declined following an unwarranted wage shock. Can we infer that an unwarranted wage shock 
would be harmful to economy-wide profitability? Not necessarily, as the profitability of the non-affected 
firms may have risen due to a switch in demand towards their products, driven for example by differential 
cost and price developments between affected and non-affected firms or sectors. Alternatively, the rise in 
wage income may have contributed to the emergence of new firms within a sector or of entire sectors, 
which depend on mass consumption demand in order to be profitable.
8 Moreover, as Murphy et al. (1989) 
have demonstrated, the payment of a wage premium to workers of would-be technologically advanced 
firms can make profitable the adoption of such superior technologies, leading to an economy-wide 
increase in profits despite the appearance of excessive wage increases at the firm level. It is therefore the 
potential influence of these intersectoral repercussions that one hopes to also take into account when 
examining aggregate profit equations. 
 
3. Determining profits and unwarranted wage changes 
 
3.1. Empirical setup 
Although several studies have examined the determinants of profitability at the industry level using firm-
level of sectoral-level data, surprisingly the existing empirical literature aiming at estimating aggregate 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Matsuyama (2002), for the development of an argument along these lines. Malley and Moutos 
(2006) present another way in which a switch in demand in advanced OECD countries could be instrumental in this 
respect. They present a model in which developed countries have comparative advantage in the production of high-
quality varieties. An unwarranted wage increase in this context this will increase (reduce) demand for domestically 
produced (imported) goods, thus potentially offsetting the decline in profits that unwarranted wage increases entail. 
The role of inequality could also prove an important determinant of the effect of excessive wage increases in this 
context, since, to the extent that reductions in inequality are associated with excessive wage increases, agents can 
switch demand away from low-quality imported varieties and towards high-quality, domestically produced varieties.    8
profit equations is quite limited and is only indirectly related to the issue of unwarranted wage changes.
9 
Finkel and Tuttle (1971) were the first who attempted to identify empirically the determinants of the 
aggregate corporate profit margin by using capacity utilization, unit labour cost, inflation and exports. The 
authors examined whether a rise in unit labour cost, defined as the ratio of wages per hour over 
productivity, is associated with a fall in the profit margin. Their empirical findings attested to a clear 
negative association between unit labour costs and profit margins. This finding is corroborated by the 
stylized facts presented in the study by Bottazi et al. (1996) who used a sample of OECD countries and 
showed that the average correlation between the profit and wage rates is negative for all but four countries 
(which include the US). Alesina et al. (2002) examined the effects of various fiscal variables on profits, 
proxied by gross profits per unit of capital in the business sector. They found that all revenues and 
spending variables exert a negative impact on profits with government wages having the largest negative 
effect (mostly through their influence on private sector wage outcomes) . 
Our central aim is to analyze how net return on capital for the total economy is affected by wage 
changes that do not reflect changes in productivity. The estimated equation has the following form: 
 
 nrki,t = β0 + β1 ewi,t + β2 nrki,t-1 + β3 Zi,t + µi + λt + εi,t (1) 
 
where nrki,t and ewi,t denote profits and excessive wages in country i at period t respectively. In turn, the 
parameter β1 measures the causal impact of excessive wages on capital return. The lagged value of capital 
return on the right hand side is included to capture potentially mean-reverting dynamics triggered by long-
run economic cycles and also the well-known persistence in profits (see, for instance, Geroski and 
Jacquemin, 1988; Mueller, 1990; Goddard and Wilson, 1999; McGahan and Porter, 1999; Glen et al., 
2001). The terms µi and λt allow for country dummies and time-specific effects respectively, and εi,t is the 
error term with E(εi,t) = 0 for all i and t. The vector Zi,t is a set of exogenous variables that control for 
                                                 
9 There is however a relatively larger literature that has attempted to identify the determinants of profits at the 
sectoral level using measures of the market value or accounting profits (e.g., Schmalensee, 1989; McGahan and 
Porter, 2002). The determinants include firm-specific characteristics, like market share, market share growth, 
productivity, firm concentration ratio, replacement value capital stock and growth of the firm, as well as market 
structure and industry-specific characteristics, like barriers to entry, stock of advertising, stock of research and 
development, and efficient-size measures.    9
profits-related characteristics and includes the initial value of the per capita output growth rate as a 
measure of aggregate domestic demand, the real interest rate as a measure of the cost of capital, the 
average level of schooling of the population as a measure of technology in the economy, and the share of 
government capital expenditures in total government expenditures that increases aggregate productivity 
and capital return through the positive impact of productive infrastructure for economic activity. 
Regarding the construction of an indicator for unwarranted wage changes, one may well think that 
such a measure is provided by the “unit labour cost” variable calculated by the OECD. However, as 
argued by Feldstein (2008), wages have not risen as rapidly as total compensation because of the rise in 
fringe benefits and other non-cash payments. Thus, we need to compare the productivity rise with the 
increase of total compensation rather than with the increase of the narrower measure of just wages and 
salaries. Along this line, and following Malley and Moutos (2006), we obtain excessive wages by 
estimating the following regression for each country using annual data over the period 1970-2000: 
 
 lnWt = α0 + α1 lnPt + ut   (2) 
 
 
where Wt is the real total compensation per employee and Pt is the productivity index. The residuals, ut, 
are defined as excessive wages, ewt, applied in the estimated regressions. 
 
3.2. Data 
Based on data availability, we use a panel of 19 OECD countries to estimate equations over the period 
1970-2000.
10 We follow the standard approach of constructing 5-year period averages so as to minimize 
business cycle effects and the well-known procyclicality of profits and wages (see Bottazzi et al., 1996).
11 
The detailed presentation of the dataset can be found in the Data Appendix of the paper. 
Our first concern is to choose an appropriate capital return indicator for our dependent variable. The 
                                                 
10 The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
11 We have experimented with averaging the data over shorter subperiods (3-year periods), obtaining qualitatively 
similar results with 5-year averaged data.   10
two main sources of profit data are national account and corporate account data. We use here national 
account data since they cover the whole economy and are more consistent across countries and time. 
Generally, the measurement of profits and capital return at the macroeconomic level is subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty. The measurement of the net rate of return on capital is affected by all the difficulties 
related to the calculation of the capital stock. On the other hand, the measurement of profits may contain 
distortions associated with the difficulties in measuring other economic variables since profits are in 
general calculated as a residual. The gross operating surplus is the national account measure of profits but 
it is not net of corporate income tax or interest payments. Its definition on a net (of depreciation) basis 
may be more meaningful economically, but its calculation faces the difficulty of defining the depreciation 
rate across countries, across sectors of activity and across time. We attempt to minimize this uncertainty 
by considering several capital return (or profit) indicators. We use three alternative indicators of profit 
development as our dependent variable, all obtained by AMECO database (European Commission, 
Economic and Financial Affairs Indicators), namely the net return on net capital stock, nrk, the gross 
operating surplus as a share of GDP, gpr/y, and the net (of depreciation) operating surplus as a share of 
GDP, npr/y.
12 We relate profits either to output or to capital stock since absolute measures of profits 
reflect mainly the size of the economy. 
In our basic regressions we measure excessive wages by using real total compensation per employee, 
defined as compensation per employee deflated by GDP deflator, over the OECD productivity index. 
Notice that productivity is measured in terms of hours worked, rather than employment, and hence it 
captures variations in both the extensive and the intensive margin of labour utilization. Variations along 
the  intensive margin (i.e. hours of work) of labour utilization have important consequences for the 
movement of both hourly productivity and hourly real wages during the business cycle. For example, 
during a downturn firms (constrained by workers’ reservation utilities) may be willing to increase the 
hourly wage rate in order to contain the reduction in workers’ take-home pay which results from the 
                                                 
12 For an extensive discussion about the advantages and shortcomings of our three profits variables see ECB Monthly 
Bulletin (2004). Note that nrk is not available for Switzerland.   11
decline in hours of work (Bernanke, 1986). Work intensity also varies during the business cycle; during 
downturns there is an increased excess of total paid-for to actual effective hours worked which impacts 
adversely on measured productivity (Darby and Hart, 2008). Our use of five-year averages should 
minimize the influence of these effects. 
As a final step, we specify the set of control variables, Z, which will be included in equation (1). We 
obtain the growth rate of output per capita, gypc, and government capital expenditure as a ratio of total 
government expenditure, gcap/g, from World Bank, World Development Indicators. The real interest rate, 
rir is obtained from the Baker at al. (2004) dataset that draws from IMF data.
13 Variable educ stands for 
average years of schooling taken from a dataset collected by Barro and Lee (2000) and interpolated by 
Nickell (2006). 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section we initially present evidence from estimated regressions under the central assumption that 
excessive wages are exogenous to the return on capital. We then address the potential endogeneity of 
excessive wages by conducting panel estimations based on instrumental variable (IV) techniques. 
 
4.1. Baseline results 
Our baseline results from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 1. As stated above, we estimate our 
model using three different profit indicators as our dependent variable. The net rate of return on capital is 
the dependent variable in columns (1)-(3), gross profits as a share of GDP is the dependent variable in 
columns (4)-(6) and net profits to GDP ratio is the dependent variable in columns (7)-(9).  
Specifically, columns (1), (4) and (7) report the results of the OLS estimation of equation (1) when 
only the ‘core’ control variables, namely the demand indicator and the capital cost are included in the 
profit equation. In order avoid the potential endogeneity of per capita income growth we use its initial 
value, which may plausibly be taken as exogenous to the subsequent five years of the capital return and 
                                                 
13 This dataset was created by the IMF and was used for the fourth chapter of April 2003 World Economic Outlook 
‘Unemployment and labour market institutions: Why reforms pay off’.    12
profits. As can be readily seen, independently from the profit indicator used, excessive wages, ew, are 
negative and statistically significant providing clear evidence for a negative impact of ew on profits. Also, 
in all cases the control variables have the expected sign. Specifically, output growth per capita, gypc, has a 
positive effect on the profit share while the real interest, rir, enters with a positive but statistically 
insignificant coefficient. 
In columns (2), (4) and (8) we repeat the same exercise after including the average level of schooling, 
educ and the lagged government capital expenditure ratio, gcap/g, in our estimated specification. The 
coefficient of educ is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (5) indicating that a rise in the 
educational level of the working population has a positive impact on profits. The impact of gcap/g on the 
gross and net profit-to-GDP ratio is also positive and statistically significant while gcap/g does not seem 
to exert a significant impact on the net rate of return on capital. Thus, our results support partly the 
argument that shifting government expenditure towards its more ‘productive’ component, namely capital 
expenditure, may have a positive impact on aggregate productivity and profits. 
Finally, in columns (3), (6) and (9) we estimate the dynamic form of equation (1) by performing the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology for dynamic panel data estimation to account for the impact of 
lagged profits on current profits. In all cases the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
statistically insignificant. The impact of excessive wages on profits retains its statistical significance, 
whereas the coefficient on gypc is found to be statistically significant at the 10% statistical significance 
level only in the case where the net return on capital is the dependent variable. The coefficient of real 
interest reported in column (3) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that a rise in cost of 
capital will have a negative effect on the net rate of return on capital. The government capital expenditure 
ratio is positive and statistical significant in all three cases although its statistical significance level is 
lower in columns (6) and (9). Finally, the coefficient of the average schooling level is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% statistical significance level in columns (3) and (6). For these 
specifications, we also report the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, the existence of which can 
cause a bias to both the estimated coefficients and standard errors. The p-values of the AR(2) test do not   13
indicate the presence of serial correlation. 
To sum up, our results indicate that excessive wages, proxied by the part of wage growth that cannot 
be explained by changes in productivity, have a negative impact on profits. This result is robust to the 
definitions of profits, the variables included in the estimated specification and the estimation procedure. In 
the next section we investigate how the assumption of exogeneity of excessive wages affects our results. 
 
4.2. Addressing the endogeneity of excessive wages 
The negative impact of unwarranted wages on capital return, established in the previous subsection, can be 
challenged by the endogeneity of unwarranted wages. While we do not have an ideal source of exogenous 
variation to estimate any causal effects of unwarranted wages on capital return, there are some promising 
potential instruments and we experiment with several instrument sets to account for the robustness of the 
results. The identification restriction is that  ,, , (, | , , , ) 0 it it it i t Cov instrument ε µλ = Z , where instrument 
denotes the instrumental variables used in the first-stage regression. Below we present the instrument sets 
along with empirical evidence. 
One main instrument related to unwarranted wage changes is the degree of wage bargaining 
centralization. It is well known (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991) that labour markets in the United States and 
Canada have the distinctive feature of overlapping, long-term wage agreements, which are only partially 
indexed, whereas other economies have some combination of short-term contracts, high indexation, or 
centralized bargaining. The stylized facts regarding the centralization (or coordination) of wage bargaining 
are that in Anglo-Saxon countries there is no coordination of wage bargaining, whereas in the Nordic 
countries and Austria there is a high degree of explicit coordination, with the rest of the countries falling 
in between these extremes (OECD, 1997).
14 In the Nordic countries (e.g. Sweden), the high degree of 
coordination took the form of gearing wage policy towards maintaining the productivity of the sector 
exposed to international competition, with economy-wide wage increases tied to productivity growth in 
                                                 
14 For instance, the IG METALL in Germany provides implicit coordination, whereas in Japan during the “spring 
offensive” the unions communicate their wage targets, which become the focal point of individual wage bargains.   14
the traded sector. To the extent that productivity growth in the non-traded (service) sector was lagging 
behind compared to the traded sector and that the wage growth differential between the two sectors did not 
match the differential productivity growth, this may well show up as an unwarranted wage increase at the 
macroeconomic level. On the other hand, Calmfors and Drifill (1988) have argued that centralized 
bargaining leads to an internalization of the price-level externality present when bargaining takes place at 
the industry level, thus constraining the appearance of unwarranted wage changes.
15  
We proxy the level of wage bargaining centralization, cwb, by an index of bargaining coordination 
taken from Ochel (2000) and interpolated by Nickell (2006), which has a range {1,3} and is increasing 
with the level of coordination. Table 2 presents the results when cwb is used as an instrument for 
excessive wages. The lower panel of Table 2 reports first-stage regressions for excessive wages with or 
without lagged profits (the first-stage regression is common for specifications (1) to (3)). The 
corresponding first-stage regression for excessive wages, ew, in specifications (4) to (6) include cwb, the 
lagged value of profits, the vector Z, and the country dummies and time effects. The coefficient on cwb 
has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in all first-stage regressions. The upper panel 
of Table 2 reports the results from the second stage where cwb is used as an instrument for ew. The 
coefficient of excessive wages is found to be statistically insignificant in all cases, which implies that 
taking into account the endogeneity of excessive wages eliminates their impact on profits. The rest of the 
variables retain their signs and significance levels. 
Alternatively, we include the level of minimum wage/median wage as an instrument along with wage 
bargaining centralization. In a profit-maximizing framework a rise in the minimum wage raises labour 
costs and reduces profits. However, the fall in profits depends on the extent to which other decisions by 
firms, like reductions in non-wage benefits or shifts in the mix of factor inputs away from minimum wage 
labour, offset the rise in the minimum wage (Neumark and Wascher, 2008). Card and Krueger (1995) 
have shown that in efficiency wage models, in which firms choose both the employment and the wage 
                                                 
15 Eichengreen (1996) argues that centralization and coordination of sectoral wage negotiations in post-War II 
Europe were a key institutional feature of its growth success by moderating wage claims and thus inducing a rise in 
profits and investment.    15
rate, a rise in excessive wages brought about by a rise in the minimum wage can leave profits unchanged, 
as cost-saving behaviour may induce a movement towards the production frontier that can offset the 
increased labour costs. Some microeconomic studies have examined either the effect that minimum wages 
or the formation of trade unions may have on profitability.  
In Table 3 we add as an instrument the minimum wage as a percentage of the median wage, minw, 
taken from OECD Labour Market Statistics database. Including minw decreases our sample since the 
variable is available only for ten of our sample countries. Specifically, minw does not exist for Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Although the coefficient of 
minw is statistically insignificant, including minw increases the significance of cwb. The results from the 
second stage indicate that the coefficient of excessive wages on profits is again statistically insignificant 
when either the net return of capital or the net profits to GDP ratio are used as the dependent variable. The 
picture is somewhat less clear when the gross profits to GDP ratio is used as a measure of profits, although 
the coefficient turns out again insignificant (but only marginally when the lagged dependent variable is 
included).  
As a next step, we also attempt to capture the relationship between unwarranted wages and labour 
force characteristics related to unionization and the structure of the labour force by using the share of 
employees in the service sector along with wage bargaining centralization. On the one hand, employees in 
services tend to be less unionized than employees in industry implying that their share in total 
employment may be negatively correlated with unwarranted wages. On the other hand, this share may also 
have a positive impact on ew according to the standard Balassa-Samuelson effect, since higher 
productivity growth in the traded sector may result in unwarranted wage growth in the non-traded sector. 
To account for these channels we obtain the share of employees in services in total employees, 
servemp, from OECD Employment by Activities and Status dataset, which is a subset of the Annual 
Labour Force Statistics database. Table 4 presents the results when cwb is included jointly with servemp in 
the instrument list and confirms the broad picture derived earlier on. The results show that servemp has a 
negative but only marginally statistically significant impact on excessive wages. In fact, the first-stage   16
regressions of Table 4 indicate that cwb and servemp do not identify excessive wages as well as cwb and 
minw. In the presence of such weak identification, the bias in the second stage can be substantial even if 
only a weak relationship exists between servemp and the residuals in the capital return equation. In spite 
of these issues, the results from the second stage reported at the upper half of Table 4 indicate that the 
impact of excessive wages on capital return disappears when either the net return of capital or the net 
profits to GDP ratio are used as dependent variable; However, in the case of gross profits to GDP ratio the 
coefficient on ew turns out significant. 
Finally, we explore the endogeneity of ew by using another set of instruments, which aims at 
addressing the employment characteristics and involves the age structure of the labour force and the rate 
of occupational injuries. Human capital theory suggests that even for competitive firms the payment for 
labour services need not be matched contemporaneously with their delivery. Becker’s (1964) distinction 
between general training (which increases the employee’s productivity irrespectively of the firm he works 
for) and specific training (which enhances the productivity of employees only within the firm providing it) 
implies that depending on the form of training provided, the workers may not, at any particular period of 
their life, be paid their marginal product. For example, if we examine young workers, it is only those 
receiving specific training that can be expected to earn their current marginal product (as the firm would 
have to pay them their opportunity cost in order to retain them); by the same token, if we look at older 
workers, it is only those that have received general training that can be expected to earn their current 
marginal product (Hutchens, 1989). Similarly, Lazear’s (1979) incentive-compatible model of wage 
growth is predicting an age-earnings profile that is steeper than the evolution of worker productivity. 
Hellerstein et al. (1999) find that older workers (aged 55 and over) are receiving a wage premium that 
exceeds any estimated productivity differential (which is, in fact, sometimes significantly negative) 
relative to younger workers. They also find that prime-aged (35-54) workers are equally productive to 
their younger counterparts, but their pay is higher. These results suggest that the age-related composition 
of the workforce may be an important determinant of unwarranted wage changes. In turn, occupational 
injuries reflect the safety of the workplace environment, and their lack of occurrence may be thought of as   17
a compensating wage differential. We expect the rate of occupational injuries to be correlated with 
unwarranted wages since workers will be willing to accept a risky job only if they are compensated by 
higher wages. We note that with regard to the excludability of the instruments, while there is no precise 
theory for why occupational injuries should affect capital return, it seems natural to expect that changes in 
occupational injuries over periods of five years should have no direct effects on the sources of business 
profits measure either in the form of gross or net profits, or as the net return on capital.  
The rate of occupational injuries as a ratio of total labour force, occinj, is obtained by the OECD 
Social Expenditure database and the share of the labour force aged 55-65 in total employment, lfratio, is 
obtained from OECD Labour Force Statistics by Sex and Age dataset which is a subset of the Labour 
Force Statistics database. Table 5 reports regressions where occinj and lfratio are used to instrument out 
ew. The coefficients of occinj and lfratio in the first-stage regression for excessive wages are statistically 
significant in all cases confirming that a rise in occupational injuries and the share of the labour force aged 
55-65 are associated with higher excessive wages and reinforce the view implies that occinj and lfratio are 
valid instruments for ew. Again, the results from the second stage show that the coefficient of excessive 
wages is found to be statistically insignificant in all cases.  
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
Our general findings indicate that taking into account the endogeneity of unwarranted wages eliminates 
their impact on profits. In order to test the robustness of our results to alterations in the chosen measures 
and samples we conduct a battery of sensitivity robustness tests. To save space we report here only the 
main tests and the main results; the detailed results are available upon request. 
We first exclude all observations with estimated errors in the upper and lower 5 percentile of the 
distribution. Excluding outliers results in a statistically significant coefficient of excessive wages on 
profits in columns (2) and (5) of Table 3 and in columns (3) and (6) of Tables 5. All our previous results 
remain valid. 
As a further robustness test we want to check whether our results depend on our definition of   18
unwarranted wages. To that purpose we re-estimate our model using alternative definitions of ew in order 
to test whether our results depend, firstly, on the fact that we define unwarranted wages as the product of 
an estimation process and, secondly, on the specific form of the equation from which ew is derived. We 
use as a measure of excessive wages two alternative variables that are not the outcome of an estimation 
process. The first one is the standard unit labour cost measure, calculated as the ratio between labour 
compensation per labour input (per hour or per employee) and labour productivity. Alternatively, we use 
the ratio of real compensation of employee deflated by the private consumption price index to labour 
productivity (both variables are taken from OECD, Economic Outlook database). Estimating all equations 
depicted in Tables 1-5 using any of these measures for unwarranted wages does not affect our main 
results. 
We also estimate equation (2) using alternative definitions of Wt (the real total compensation per 
employee) and Pt (the index of productivity). Specifically, we use the labour compensation per unit labour 
input and the labour compensation per employee as alternative measures of Wt and labour productivity per 
unit labour input and labour productivity per employee as alternative measures of Pt (all variables are 
taken from OECD, Economic Outlook database). 
One can further argue that productivity will affect wages with a lag (e.g. due to the existence of long-
term contacts, or delays in recognizing the precise magnitude of productivity changes). Therefore, we re-
estimate these two new versions of equation (2) as well as the initial one by assuming that Wt depends on 
lagged productivity Pt-1 instead of the current productivity level. The residual series of these five new 
versions of equation (2) can be used as alternative estimates of excessive wages. After having re-estimated 
all equations in Tables 1-5 using these alternative definitions of unwarranted wages we find that our main 
results remain unaffected. 
Although our estimates of excessive wages are derived on a country-by-country basis using equation 
(2), they might also contain country and time fixed effects.
16 To control for these effects we pool equation 
(2) and we now obtain excessive wages by estimating the following regression for each country 
                                                 
16 We wish to thank Bob Hart for alerting us to this possibility.     19
 
  lnWi,t = γ 0 + γ1 lnPi,t + ψi + ζt + vi,t   (2)’ 
 
where ψi and ζt allow for country dummies and time-specific effects respectively, and vi,t is the error term 
with E(vi,t) = 0 for all i and t. Defining excessive wages, ewi,t as the residuals vi,t from equation (2)’ 
and re-estimating the equations presented in Tables 1-5 does not affect our main results. 
Finally, Blanchard (1997) has argued that OECD countries can be placed in two groups with respect 
to the behaviour of the labour share. In the first group belong the Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, UK, 
and USA), where the labour share remained largely unchanged  during the last three decades of the 
twentieth century. In the other group of countries, consisting mostly of the continental European 
economies, there is an inverted U-shaped pattern for the labour share (high in the early 1980s and lower 
towards the end of the century). The differential movements in the labour share may be related to 
differences in collective bargaining coverage and perceived union/political strength of the labour 
movement across countries (see, OECD, 1997). According to some studies (e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 
1998a, 1998b; Nickell et al., 2005), the relatively strong trade unions in the continent managed to resist 
the moderation in wage growth that was warranted by the slowdown in productivity growth, thus inducing 
firms to redirect new investment abroad and/or to the adoption of less labour-intensive technologies. The 
resulting shortfalls in labour demand led to a rise in unemployment, which weakened the outside option of 
labour in the employment relationship and caused a terms-of-trade shift that helped restore equilibrium by 
raising the return on capital back to the level required by international markets. 
To address the potentially differential patterns of wages and profits in these countries we perform the 
analysis presented in Tables 2, 4 and 5 after excluding US, UK and Canada from our sample.
17 The results 
are summarized in Table 6. It should be noted that excluding US, UK and Canada implies that wage 
bargaining centralization together with the share of employees in services in total employment can no 
longer be considered appropriate instruments for excessive wages, as indicated by the corresponding F-
                                                 
17 We refrain from using the minimum wage as a percentage of the median wage, minw, as an additional instrument 
since doing this would reduce our sample to only 7 countries.   20
test
18. Yet, as can be readily seen the main picture remains quite robust to the exclusion of the Anglo-
Saxon countries. When wage bargaining centralization is used as an instrument for excessive wages the 
results (shown in the upper part of Table 6) are quite similar to those presented in Table 2. The same holds 
when the rate of occupational injuries as a ratio of total labour force and the share of the labour force aged 
55-65 in total employment are used as instruments for excessive wages. Comparing the results shown in 
the lower part of Table 6 to those of Table 5, the impact of excessive wages on capital return and profits 
disappears in all cases.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the effect of unwarranted wage changes, defined as wage changes which can not 
be accounted by changes in labour productivity, on capital return. Although, a cursory look at the data 
reveals a negative association between the two variables, we find that taking into account the endogeneity 
of unwarranted wage changes with respect to the return on capital and profits shows that there is no causal 
relationship between the two variables. 
Are our results at odds with the standard policy prescriptions, which seem to imply that unwarranted 
wage changes are detrimental to profitability? Our analysis shows that such a simple-minded inference is 
flawed, and that such policy prescriptions have to be assessed in the context of more fully articulated 
models, which allow for the underlying driving factors of unwarranted wage changes. For example, an 
observation of wages rising faster than labour productivity may induce some policy makers to propose 
measures intended to reverse this rise in excessive wages (e.g., to propose reductions in minimum wages); 
our results demonstrate that this would be a wrong policy action if, for example, what would appear as 
unwarranted wage changes was the result of (privately efficient) rent-sharing mechanisms.  
                                                 
18 Many economists have attributed the “employment gap” between the continental European countries and the 
Anglo-Saxon countries to the superior expansion of service-sector employment in the latter group of countries (e.g., 
European Commission, 2002). The slow expansion of the service sector in the continent, along with the fact that non-
unionized service-sector workers are covered through extension-laws by collective bargaining agreements are 
possible explanations for why the moderate changes in service-sector employment are not found to be important 
determinants of excessive wage changes.    21
APPENDIX 
Excessive wages and their co-movement with profits: An example 
 
In the Appendix we present a simple illustration of the possibility that changes in some “deep” 
parameters relating to the labour market can induce positive co-movements of excessive wages 
and the return on capital.  
Consider a perfectly competitive firm run by an entrepreneur, which is the residual claimant of what 
is left (profits) after paying for the use of factor services (capital, K, and labour, L). We assume that the 
firm does not act as if facing a perfectly elastic labour supply schedule, and that it manipulates the wage 
offered to its employees in order to maximize its profits (or equivalently, to minimize the cost per 
efficiency unit of labour). The production function takes a CES form given by:  
() Qe LK
α
ρρ ρ   =+ (A.1) 
where Q denotes output, e stands for the efficiency (or effort) of each unit of labour, ρ ≤ 1, determines the 
size of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, 1/(1 ) σ ρ ≡ − , and α < 1 implies decreasing 
returns to scale.  
A convenient specification of the effort function assumes that productivity (effort) does not depend 
on the level of the wage offered by the firm, but rather on the relative attractiveness of wages offered 
inside and outside the firm. A particular parameterization of this concept is due to Summers (1988) and 







− =  ,  0 θ >  (A.2) 
where w is the wage paid by the firm and b summarizes the outside-wage opportunities.  
The perfectly competitive firm, in addition to the levels of K (whose rental cost is r) and L, also sets 
the wage rate so as to maximize profits, Π, which are equal to: 








− Π= + − −  (A.3) 
The first-order conditions yield the optimal (“efficiency”) wage chosen by the firm, 







   (A.4)   22
As is standard in efficiency wage models, equation (A.4) implies that the efficiency wage set by the firm 
is a mark-up on the level of the alternative opportunities available to the workers. (If  0 θ = , the firm pays 
the competitive wage rate.) 
 Combining (A.2) and (A.4) we get that the optimal level of effort, 











   (A.5) 
We note from equations (A.4) and (A.5) that the optimal wage rate and the resulting optimal level of effort 
depend only on b and θ (which are exogenous from the firm’s point of view). After some manipulations 
we can obtain the optimal levels for labour and capital, 
* L  and 
* K , as: 
11 1
1 11 1 * we L
ρ ρ α
ρ ρρ α α α
 −   − −   − −− −    ∆ =  (A.6) 
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11 1 * Kr
ρ α
ρρ α α α
−   −   −− −   ∆ =  (A.7) 
where, 
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− −− − −− −    ∆≡ + = +   −−  
. 
The profit-maximizing level of output, 
* Q , can be calculated by substituting equations (A.6), and 
(A.7) into (A.1). Substituting 
* L , 
* K  and 
* Q in the profit equation (A.3), we get that: 
1 1
1 1 * (1 )
αρ
ρα α αα
−   −   − −   Π− ∆ =  (A.8) 
We are interested in finding how changes in θ  affect both the development of wages (






≡ , and the return on capital. The “excessive wage”,  exc w , is defined as the ratio 
of wages to labour productivity and the return on capital,  K r , is defined as the sum of capital costs plus 
“entrepreneurial” profits, 
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Given these definitions, it is straightforward to show the following Result. 
                                                 
19 Our definition of excessive wages is identical to the labour share in this model. However, in actual economies the 
data for the labour share are also shaped by the existence of self-employed individuals and of the public sector.   23
 
Result A1. A change in the elasticity of effort with respect to the relative wage differential, θ, causes 
excessive wages and the return on capital to move in the same direction. 
 
































   (A.10) 
We note from the definition of ∆, that the effect of changes in θ  on ∆ are in the same direction as the 
effects of changes in  θ  on 
(1 )
11 ** 11 1 (1 ) we b
ρρ ρ ρθ θ ρ
ρρ ρρ ρ θ θ
  − −−
  −− − −−   =− . Thus, any change in θ will, by inspection 
of equations (A.9) and (A.10), cause changes in the return on capital and in the ratio of wages and 
productivity in the same direction (i.e., both to rise, or both to fall).  
      The above result is independent of the size of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. 
Nevertheless, the elasticity of substitution, σ, determines the direction in which both excessive wages and 
the return on capital change in response to changes in θ. Indeed, we find that  
()













Equation (A.11) makes clear that if the production function is Cobb-Douglas ( 0 ρ = ), both excessive 
wages (and the return on capital) are not affected by changes in θ. In signing the above expression, in 
addition to ρ, the parameter value that is of particular interest to us is θ, the elasticity of effort with respect 
to the “relative wage differential”. Summers (1988) notes that even very small values of this parameter 
can generate sizeable unemployment rates, and suggests that values close to 0.04 are reasonable values for 
this parameter. Assuming that θ < 0.5, implies that ln(1 ) ln 0 θ θ − −>  and, thus the sign of (A.11) depends 
on the elasticity of substitution. If,  0 ρ > , the elasticity of substitution is larger than unity, and in this case 
both excessive wages and the return on capital will fall in response to a rise in θ.   
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Data Appendix 
 
A. Profit variables 
 
nrk: Net returns on net capital stock defined as net domestic income minus wage income as a ratio of net 
capital stock (source: AMECO, code: APNDK, APNDK = [UVND - [UWCD × (NETD : NWTD)]] : 
[(OKND × PIGT) : 10.000] where UVND = Net domestic income at current market prices, UWCD = 
Compensation of employees, NETD = Employment, persons, NWTD = Employees, persons, OKND = 
Net capital stock at constant prices, PIGT = Price deflator gross fixed capital formation) 
gpr/y: gross operating surplus as a share of GDP, defined as GDP less compensation of employees less 
taxes (minus subsidies) on production over GDP (source: AMECO, code: UVGD). 
npr/y: net (of depreciation) operating surplus as a share of GDP, defined as gross operating surplus minus 
consumption of fixed capital (source: AMECO, code: UOND, UOND = UOGD – UKCT where UKCT= 
consumption of fixed capital) over GDP. 
 
B. Instruments for excessive wages 
 
cwb: index of bargaining coordination (taken from Ochel (2000) and interpolated by Nickell (2006), code: 
cow (int)). 
minw: minimum wage as percentage of the median wage (source: OECD Labour Market Statistics 
database, taken from Nickell (2006), code: minw_med). 
servemp: share of employees in services in total employees (source: OECD, Employment by Activities 
and Status (ALFS) dataset, Annual Labour Force Statistics (ALFS) database, codes: Employees in 
Services (ISIC rev.2, 6-9) and Employees in all activities (ISIC rev.2)). 
occinj: total cases of compensated occupational injuries (source: OECD, Social Expenditure database, 
code: Reported injuries, total cases (fatal+non-fatal), ISIC-Rev. 3, as a ratio of total labour force (source: 
OECD, Economic Outlook, code: Labour force). 
lfratio: share of the labour force aged 55-65 in total employment (source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics 
by Sex and Age, Labour Force Statistics (LFS) database, code: share of employment, 55-65). 
 
C. Other variables 
 
W: real total compensation per employee defined as compensation per employee deflated by GDP deflator 
(source: OECD, Economic Outlook, codes: Compensation per Employee, total economy and Deflator for 
GDP at Market Prices). 
P: productivity index (source: OECD, Economic Outlook, code: Productivity Index). 
rir: real interest rate (source: Baker et al. (2004), based on IMF, International Financial Statistics, code: 
rir). 
gypc: per capita output growth rate (source: World Bank, World Development Indicators) 
educ: average years of schooling (source: Barro and Lee (2000), interpolated by Nickell (2006), code: 
educ (int)). 
gcap/g: defined as capital expenditures as a share of total government expenditure, (source: World 
Development Indicators).   28
TABLE 1. Profit equation: exogenous excessive wages 
 
  net return on capital  gross profits/GDP  gross profits/GDP 
  F.E.  F.E. A-B F.E. F.E. A-B F.E. F.E. A-B 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   0.050        
(nrk)–1  
   ( 0 . 5 1 )         
      0.193      (gpr/y)–1  
      (1.11)     
         0 . 1 9 3  
(npr/y)–1 
         ( 1 . 1 1 )  
-1.888 -2.127 -2.520 -0.351 -0.454 -0.519 -0.351 -0.454 -0.519  ew 
(-4.93) (-4.63) (-6.51) (-4.23) (-5.23) (-6.94) (-4.23) (-5.23) (-6.94) 
0.269 -0.135  -1.257 0.123 0.061 0.100 0.123 0.061 0.100  rir 
(0.50) (-0.25) (-2.85) (1.12) (0.63) (1.85) (1.12) (0.63) (1.85) 
2.012 1.562 1.087 0.364 0.199 0.131 0.364 0.199 0.131 
gypc 
(3.01) (2.57) (1.79) (2.78) (1.86) (1.45) (2.78) (1.86) (1.45) 
 4.334  5.288  0.681  0.938  0.681  0.938  educ 
 (1.66)  (1.85)  (1.89)  (1.89)  (1.89)  (1.89) 
 0.924  2.192  0.280  0.264  0.280  0.264  (gcap/g)–1  
 (1.08)  (2.36)  (2.56)  (1.75)  (2.56)  (1.75) 
R
2  0.79  0.83  0.51  0.64  0.51  0.64  
AR(2)     0.15    0.23    0.23 
Countries (obs.)  18 (98)  18 (83)  17 (65)  19 (100) 19 (84)  17 (65)  19 (100)  19 (84)  17 (65) 
 
Notes: 
i) F.E. denotes estimation by Fixed Effects OLS and A-B denotes estimation by the Arellano-Bond estimation method. A constant 
is included in all regressions. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. AR(2) is the test on second-
order autocorrelation of the residuals. 
ii) Due to data availability Germany and Poland are excluded in regressions (3), (6) and (9) and Switzerland is excluded in 
regressions (1)-(3).    29
TABLE 2. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instrument: centralization of wage bargaining) 
 
Dep.  variable  nrk gpr/y  npr/y nrk gpr/y  npr/y 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    -0.382     (nrk)–1  
    (-1.30)    
     0.037    (gpr/y)–1  
     (0.34)   
      - 0 . 0 1 5   (npr/y)–1 
      (-0.07) 
1.427 -0.365 0.116 2.159 -0.382 0.125  ew 
(0.73) (-1.44) (0.30) (0.87) (-1.47) (0.29) 
-0.357 0.056 0.104 -0.270 0.049 0.106  rir 
(-0.54) (0.61) (0.70) (-0.38) (0.54) (0.71) 
1.771 0.204 0.356 1.910 0.196 0.359  gypc 
(2.04) (2.03) (2.22) (1.96) (1.82) (2.11) 
0.096 0.575 0.048 -2.203 0.608 0.026  educ 
(0.02) (1.14) (0.05) (-0.36) (1.21) (0.02) 
-0.231 0.251 0.264 -0.142 0.239 0.268  (gcap/g)–1 
(-0.24) (1.13) (1.38) (-0.14) (1.89) (1.50) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
-2.151    -1.918  -2.094  -1.973  cwb 
(-2.61)    (-2.30) (-2.54) (-2.32) 
    0.056     (nrk)–1  
     (1.67)    
       0.056   (gpr/y)–1  
     (0.35)   
        0.136  (npr/y)–1 
      (0.86) 
0.008      -0.006 -0.002 -0.016  rir 
(0.05)    (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.10) 
0.099    0.068  0.085  0.065  gypc 
(0.57)    (0.39)  (0.46)  (0.36) 
1.742    1.893  1.745  1.800  educ 
(1.76)    (1.83)  (1.72)  (1.71) 
0.317    0.270  0.291  0.245  (gcap/g)–1  
(1.98)    (1.64)  (1.78)  (1.52) 
First-stage R
2 0.53     0.55  0.53  0.53 
F-test (p-value)  0.010     0.024 0.012 0.022 
Countries (obs.)  19 (84)      18 (83)  19 (84)  19 (84) 
 
Notes:  
i) A constant is included in all regressions. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
ii) Due to data availability Switzerland is excluded in regression (4).  
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TABLE 3. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instruments: centralization of wage bargaining, minimum wages) 
Dep. variable  nrk  gpr/y  npr/y  nrk  gpr/y  npr/y 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    -0.322     (nrk)–1  
    (-1.47)    
     0.099    (gpr/y)–1  
     (1.09)   
      0.201  (npr/y)–1 
      (1.37) 
0.785 -0.320 0.163 1.891 -0.358 -0.034  ew 
(0.51) (-1.90) (0.60) (1.08) (-2.17) (-0.12) 
-0.260 0.023 0.067 -0.323 0.022 0.086  rir 
(-0.30) (0.32) (0.55) (-0.37) (0.32) (0.97) 
1.045 0.088 0.271 1.419 0.067 0.223  gypc 
(0.95) (0.66) (1.26) (1.15) (0.48) (1.09) 
-0.952 -0.655 -0.872 0.382 -0.745 -0.929  educ 
(-0.12) (-1.04) (-0.50) (0.04) (-1.14) (0.71) 
0.251 0.429 0.461 -0.049 0.387 0.437  (gcap/g)–1 
(0.27) (4.40) (2.95) (-0.05) (3.80) (3.04) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
-3.342    -3.273  -3.381  -3.303  cwb 
(-3.29)    (-3.06) (-3.39) (-3.21) 
-0.170    -0.158  -0.228  -0.161  minw  
(-1.52)    (-1.36) (-1.38) (-0.91) 
    0.009     (nrk)–1  
     (0.25)    
      -0.147   (gpr/y)–1  
     (-0.50)   
       0.021  (npr/y)–1 
      (0.07) 
-0.171    -0.162  -0.197  -0.164  rir 
(-0.10)    (-0.56) (-0.64) (-0.57) 
0.031    0.026  0.023  0.031  gypc 
(0.10)    (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
0.248    0.179  0.566  0.216  educ 
(0.07)    (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.06) 
0.409    0.407  0.481  0.400  (gcap/g)–1  
(2.14)    (2.09)  (2.30)  (1.89) 
J-statistic  0.60 0.24 0.64 0.96 0.31 0.82 
First-stage R
2   0.70      0.70  0.70  0.70 
F-test (p-value)  0.004      0.009  0.002  0.013 
Countries (obs.)  10 (40)      10 (40)  10 (40)  10 (40) 
 
Notes: See Table 2. Due to data availability Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland are excluded in all regressions   31
TABLE 4. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instruments: centralization of wage bargaining, ratio of employees in services) 
 
Dep.  variable  nrk gpr/y npr/y nrk gpr/y npr/y 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    -0.270     (nrk)–1  
    (-1.38)    
       0.060   (gpr/y)–1  
     (0.44)   
      0.149  (npr/y)–1 
      (0.73) 
0.453 -0.401 -0.321 1.040 -0.437 -0.412  ew 
(0.37) (-2.19) (-1.49) (0.69) (-2.10) (-1.55) 
-0.231 0.080 0.158 -0.143 0.072 0.136  rir 
(-0.36) (0.75) (1.07) (-0.21) (0.68) (1.03) 
1.444 0.209 0.325 1.593 0.199 0.297  gypc 
(1.84) (1.856) (1.45)  (1.83) (1.67) (2.19) 
-1.603 0.501 0.190 -3.201 0.556 0.368  educ 
(-0.46) (1.19) (0.35) (-0.71) (1.30) (0.64) 
0.634 0.299 0.544 0.610 0.286 0.505  (gcap/g)–1 
(0.65) (2.29) (2.86) (0.60) (2.23) (2.87) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
-2.079    -1.945  -2.007  -1.892  cwb 
(-2.15)    (-2.02) (-2.04) (-1.88) 
-0.446    -0.397  -0.431  -0.419  servemp 
(-1.93)    (-1.69) (-1.74) (-1.77) 
    0.042     (nrk)–1  
    (1.18)    
      0.057   (gpr/y)–1  
     (0.28)   
       0.141  (npr/y)–1 
      (0.77) 
0.212    0.173  0.198  0.180  rir 
(0.83)    (0.67)  (0.71)  (0.67) 
0.110    0.080  0.096  0.073  gypc 
(0.55)    (0.40)  (0.45)  (0.35) 
1.626    1.745  1.622  1.646  educ 
(1.57)    (1.57)  (1.53)  (1.51) 
0.400    0.365  0.374  0.330  (gcap/g)–1  
(2.11)    (1.83)  (1.78)  (1.60) 
J-statistic  0.15 0.76 0.03 0.18 0.76 0.03 
rst-stage R
2   0.54      0.55  0.54  0.54 
F-test (p-value)  0.008      0.023  0.023  0.029 
Countries (obs.)  18 (74)      18 (74)  18 (74)  18 (74) 
 
Notes: See Table 2. Due to data availability Switzerland is excluded in all regressions.   32
TABLE 5. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instruments: occupational injuries, labour force 55-65 ratio) 
Dep.  variable  nrk gpr/y npr/y nrk gpr/y npr/y 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    -0.36     (nrk)–1  
    (-0.84)    
     -0.14    (gpr/y)–1  
       (-0.77)  
      - 0 . 0 4   (npr/y)–1 
      (-0.16) 
-0.50 -0.13 -0.05 -0.25 -0.13 -0.04  ew 
(-0.44) (-0.88) (-0.22) (-0.19) (-0.86) (-0.19) 
0.09 -0.02 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.17  rir 
(0.06) (-0.10) (0.51) (0.09) (0.03) (0.55) 
2.91 0.13 0.43 3.25 0.16 0.44  gypc 
(2.84) (0.94) (2.43) (2.84) (1.07) (2.31) 
5.02 0.45 0.32 3.57 0.19 0.23  educ 
(0.59) (0.40) (0.20) (0.46) (0.17) (0.16) 
1.00 0.06 0.11 1.10 0.08 0.12  (gcap/g)–1 
(0.71) (0.36) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.48) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
1.783    1.498  2.014  1.845  occinj 
(2.63)    (2.14)  (2.58)  (2.27) 
1.439    1.597  1.364  1.406  lfratio 
(2.10)    (2.34)  (2.12)  (2.07) 
    0.098     (nrk)–1  
    (0.14)    
       -0.359   (gpr/y)–1  
       (-1.03)  
        -0.055  (npr/y)–1 
      (-0.17) 
0.095    0.017  0.213  0.127  rir 
(0.20)    (0.04)  (0.45)  (0.24) 
-0.165    -0.243  -0.090  -0.152  gypc 
(-0.61)    (-0.94) (-0.30) (-0.52) 
1.263    1.544  0.685  1.143  educ 
(0.59)    (0.76)  (0.31)  (0.48) 
-0.156    -0.173  -0.115  -0.147  (gcap/g)–1  
(-0.54)    (-0.65) (-0.38) (-0.49) 
J-statistic  0.73 0.22 0.75 0.96 0.29 0.75 
First-stage R
2   0.62      0.65  0.64  0.62 
F-test (p-value)  0.008      0.028  0.013  0.014 
Countries (obs.)  16 (45)      15 (44)  16 (45)  16 (45) 
 
Note: See Table 2. Due to data availability Austria, Netherlands and US are excluded in all regressions and 
Switzerland is excluded in regression (4).   33
TABLE 6. Profit equations for non-Anglosaxon countries: IV estimates 
 
Dep.  variable  nrk gpr/y npr/y nrk gpr/y npr/y 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instruments: cwb  
1.862 -0.437 0.061 2.489 -0.445 0.073  ew 
(0.85) (-1.61) (0.15) (0.95) (-1.63) (0.16) 
-2.186    -1.997  -2.146  -2.0184  cwb 
(-2.41)    (-2.24) (-2.40) (-2.18) 
First-stage R
2   0.60      0.62  0.60  0.60 
F-test (p-value)  0.019      0.030  0.019  0.033 
Countries (obs.)  16 (69)      15 (68)  16 (69)  16 (69) 
Instruments: cwb, servemp 
2.275 -0.344 -0.108 2.626 -0.360 -0.169  ew 
(1.08) (-1.43) (-0.34) (1.10) (-1.43) (-0.50) 
-2.141    -2.050  -2.073  -1.970  cwb 
(2.02)    (-1.99)  (-1.94)  (-1.78) 
-0.329    -0.304  -0.319  -0.322  servemp 
(-1.07)    (-1.04) (-1.03) (-1.07) 
J-statistic  0.69 0.69 0.17 0.71 0.69 0.18 
First-stage R
2   0.61      0.63  0.61  0.62 
F-test (p-value)  0.084      0.101  0.107  0.137 
Countries (obs.)  15 (60)      15 (60)  15 (60)  15 (60) 
Instruments: occinj, lfratio 
-1.173 -0.166 -0.139 -0.935 -0.175 -0.130  ew 
(-1.09) (-1.03) (-0.58) (-0.80) (-1.08) (-0.55) 
2.048    1.748  2.201  2.045  occinj 
(2.54)    (2.20)  (2.48)  (2.23) 
1.401    1.564  1.314  1.404  lfratio 
(2.05)    (2.22)  (2.06)  (2.03) 
J-statistic  0.69 0.20 0.74 0.91 0.22 0.74 
First-stage R
2   0.62      0.67  0.63  0.62 
F-test (p-value)  0.014      0.041  0.020  0.020 
Countries (obs.)  14 (39)      13 (38)  14 (39)  14 (39) 
 
Note: See Table 2. Due to data availability the countries included are those of Tables 2, 4 and 5 with the 
exception of US, UK and Canada. 
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Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations (see the text for the exact definition of the variables). 
 
 
   35

















































Curve CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2741 Yan Dong and John Whalley, A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: 
Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent, August 2009 
 
2742 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni, Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action, August 2009 
 
2743 Christina Felfe, The Willingness to Pay for Job Amenities: Evidence from Mothers’ 
Return to Work, August 2009 
 
2744 Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Väth, Effort 
Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games, August 2009 
 
2745 Bruno S. Frey and Paolo Pamini, Making World Heritage Truly Global: The Culture 
Certificate Scheme, August 2009 
 
2746 Frank N. Caliendo, Is Social Security behind the Collapse of Personal Saving?, August 
2009 
 
2747 Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals 
and Fiscal Equalization, August 2009 
 
2748 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Apostolis Pavlou, Upstream Horizontal Mergers and 
Efficiency Gains, August 2009 
 
2749 Rüdiger Pethig and Christian Wittlich, Interaction of Carbon Reduction and Green 
Energy Promotion in a Small Fossil-Fuel Importing Economy, August 2009 
 
2750 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Monetary Policy 
Transmission and House Prices: European Cross-country Evidence, August 2009 
 
2751 Olaf Posch, Explaining Output Volatility: The Case of Taxation, August 2009 
 
2752 Beatrice Scheubel, Daniel Schunk and Joachim Winter, Don’t Raise the Retirement 
Age! An Experiment on Opposition to Pension Reforms and East-West Differences in 
Germany, August 2009 
 
2753 Daniel G. Arce, Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Suicide Terrorism and the 
Weakest Link, August 2009 
 
2754 Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific 
Unemployment, August 2009 
 
2755 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Buyer Power in International Markets, August 2009 
 
  
2756 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, The Impact of Dividend Taxation on 
Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment, August 2009 
 
2757 Mirco Tonin and Michael Vlassopoulos, Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social 
Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment, August 2009 
 
2758 Nicole Grunewald and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Driving Factors of Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and the Impact from Kyoto Protocol, August 2009 
 
2759 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh 
Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty, August 2009 
 
2760 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Jakob de Haan, Does Central Bank Communication really Lead 
to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model 
for the ECB, August 2009 
 
2761 Larry Karp, Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions, August 2009 
 
2762 Marianna Belloc and Samuel Bowles, International Trade, Factor Mobility and the 
Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, August 2009 
 
2763 Charles Noussair and Fangfang Tan, Voting on Punishment Systems within a 
Heterogeneous Group, August 2009 
 
2764 Birgit Bednar-Friedl and Karl Farmer, Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 
Policies: An Option for Withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol?, August 2009 
 
2765 Pierre M. Picard and David E. Wildasin, Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor 
Contracts, August 2009 
 
2766 Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume, The Economic Effects of Federalism and 
Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment, August 2009 
 
2767 David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner and Dennis Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, 
and Trade Costs, August 2009 
 
2768 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Hurricane Insurance in Florida, 
August 2009 
 
2769 Alessandro Balestrino, Kind of Black: The Musicians’ Labour Market in Italy, August 
2009 
 
2770 Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue, Eliciting Individual Preferences for Pension 
Reform, August 2009 
 
2771 Christian Breuer and Chang Woon Nam, VAT on Intra-Community Trade and Bilateral 
Micro Revenue Clearing in the EU, August 2009 
 
2772 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad, Jakob De Haan and Bert Scholtens, Growth and Earnings 
Persistence in Banking Firms: A Dynamic Panel Investigation, August 2009  
2773 Erdal Yalcin, Uncertain Productivity Growth and the Choice between FDI and Export, 
August 2009 
 
2774 Klaus Abberger, Wolfgang Nierhaus and Shynar Shaikh, Findings of the Signal 
Approach for Financial Monitoring in Kazakhstan, September 2009 
 
2775 Sascha O. Becker, Francesco Cinnirella and Ludger Woessmann, The Trade-off 
between Fertility and Education: Evidence from before the Demographic Transition, 
September 2009 
 
2776 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and 
Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy, September 2009 
 
2777 Joel Slemrod, Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax 
Economics, September 2009 
 
2778 Cagri Seda Kumru and Athanasios C. Thanopoulos, Social Security Reform and 
Temptation, September 2009 
 
2779 Alessandro Bucciol and Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, Inter- and Intra-generational 
Consequences of Pension Buffer Policy under Demographic, Financial and Economic 
Shocks, September 2009 
 
2780 Eduardo Strube and Marcelo Resende, Complementarity of Innovation Policies in the 
Brazilian Industry: An Econometric Study, September 2009 
 
2781 Henry Tulkens and Vincent van Steenberghe, “Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In 
Search of the Right Mix in the Face of Climate Change, September 2009 
 
2782 Maria L. Loureiro, Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano and Daniela Vuri, Smoking Habits: Like 
Father, Like Son, Like Mother, Like Daughter, September 2009 
 
2783 Momi Dahan, Tehila Kogut and Moshe Shalem, Do Economic Policymakers Practice 
what they Preach? The Case of Pension Decisions, September 2009 
 
2784 Eytan Sheshinski, Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education, September 2009 
 
2785 Nannette Lindenberg and Frank Westermann, How Strong is the Case for Dollarization 
in Costa Rica? A Note on the Business Cycle Comovements with the United States, 
September 2009 
 
2786 Leif Danziger, Noncompliance and the Effects of the Minimum Wage on Hours and 
Welfare in Competitive Labor Markets, September 2009 
 
2787 Gerlinde Fellner, Rupert Sausgruber and Christian Traxler, Testing Enforcement 
Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information, September 
2009 
 
2788 Gabriel J. Felbermayr, Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Unemployment in an 
Interdependent World, September 2009  
2789 Sebastian G. Kessing, Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices, 
September 2009 
 
2790 Daniel Gros, Global Welfare Implications of Carbon Border Taxes, September 2009 
 
2791 Louis N. Christofides, Michael Hoy and Ling Yang, The Gender Imbalance in 
Participation in Canadian Universities (1977-2005), September 2009 
 
2792 Jan K. Brueckner and Robert W. Helsley, Sprawl and Blight, September 2009 
 
2793 Vidar Christiansen and Stephen Smith, Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation, 
September 2009 
 
2794 John Beirne, Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas and Nicola 
Spagnolo, Global and Regional Spillovers in Emerging Stock Markets: A Multivariate 
GARCH-in-mean Analysis, September 2009 
 
2795 Rüdiger Pethig and Frieder Kolleß, Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition, 
Unemployment and Losses from Capital Market Integration, September 2009 
 
2796 Ngo Van Long, Horst Raff and Frank Stähler, Innovation and Trade with 
Heterogeneous Firms, September 2009 
 
2797 Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, Research Governance in Academia: Are there 
Alternatives to Academic Rankings?, September 2009 
 
2798 Thiess Buettner and Clemens Fuest, The Role of the Corporate Income Tax as an 
Automatic Stabilizer, September 2009 
 
2799 Annette Alstadsæter, Measuring the Consumption Value of Higher Education, 
September 2009 
 
2800 Peter Friedrich, Chang Woon Nam and Janno Reiljan, Local Fiscal Equalization in 
Estonia: Is a Reform Necessary?, September 2009 
 
2801 Evžen Kočenda and Jan Hanousek, State Ownership and Control in the Czech Republic, 
September 2009 
 
2802 Michael Stimmelmayr, Wage Inequality in Germany: Disentangling Demand and 
Supply Effects, September 2009 
 
2803 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Towards a Macroprudential Surveillance and Remedial Policy 
Formulation System for Monitoring Financial Crisis, September 2009 
 
2804 Margarita Katsimi, Sarantis Kalyvitis and Thomas Moutos, “Unwarranted” Wage 
Changes and the Return on Capital, September 2009 